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I.  INTRODUCTION
Family Courts have traditionally turned a blind eye to
domestic violence or have minimized its significance.
Custody disputes involving domestic violence have been
forced into a one-size-fits-all paradigm, an erroneous and
potentially life-threatening approach.  What is required is a
differentiated approach based on careful screening of cases
for the presence of domestic violence and thoughtful
consideration of the clinical and legal implications.  1
Child custody determinations are based on the fiction that
families with a history of domestic violence are all alike.  However,
researchers, scholars, and practitioners increasingly agree that
families experience and children are exposed to different types of
domestic violence.  These types of violence involve distinctly
different phenomena—they are not simply separate points along a
single continuum of abuse.
This article examines child custody determinations through the
lens of a domestic violence typology.  The resulting analysis (1)
reconciles competing viewpoints and contradictory evidence about
domestic violence; (2) matches families with appropriate child
custody court procedures and services such as parent education,
mediation, supervised visitation and parent coordination; and (3)
exposes serious deficiencies in current domestic violence child
custody statutes.
Application of the typology leads to the conclusion that child
custody courts could more effectively protect children through
identification and consideration of the type of domestic violence a
family has experienced.  To this end, three significant procedural and
substantive law reforms are recommended.  First, courts should adopt
Differentiated Case Management in order to identify cases involving
domestic violence, and to the extent possible, distinguish the type of
violence experienced.  Second, child custody court procedures and
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services should vary depending on the needs of the individual family
and type of violence experienced.  Under the current one-size-fits-all
approach, some families are referred to procedures and services that
are unsafe for them while other families, who could benefit from
those very procedures and services, are discouraged from using them.
Third, current domestic violence-related child custody statutes should
be amended to include language that targets perpetrator patterns of
coercive control.  Current statutes are not drafted with sufficient
precision to adequately protect children.
Domestic violence typologies should, of course, be approached
with caution because typologies can be inappropriately manipulated
to justify discounting the needs of some victims and children.  All
cases of domestic violence are serious and important; saying that they
are not all the same does not diminish this fact.  Families
experiencing domestic violence are different from one another, but
every case requires concentrated attention.  By analogy, a heart attack
is different and requires different treatment from cancer, but both are
serious conditions requiring medical attention.
Domestic violence situations can be life-threatening, and the
typology discussed in this article is theoretical in nature.  It should be
considered from a “what if” perspective, rather than viewed as ready
for immediate implementation.  Experienced professionals often have
difficulty detecting the existence of domestic violence—let alone
accurately discerning the type of violence involved.  Nevertheless,
viewing child custody law and procedure through the lens of a
domestic violence typology provides the opportunity to reexamine
commonly-held assumptions, open cross-disciplinary
communication, and spark creative thinking about fresh approaches
to a complicated and intractable problem.
This article is divided into five sections with the introduction
constituting Part I.  Part II presents a domestic violence typology and
related social science research.  Part III focuses on how and when
families should be linked to child custody procedures (such as parent
education and mediation) and services (such as supervised visitation
and parent coordination) through Differential Case Management.
Part IV surveys current child custody statutes (including the legal
definitions of domestic violence, domestic violence as a best interests
factor, joint custody and “friendly parent” provisions, presumptions
against custody awards to violent parents, and termination of parental
rights) and suggests specific statutory amendments aimed at
protecting children more comprehensively.  Part V  recommends how
custody cases involving specific types of domestic violence should
be handled.
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2. Claire M Renzetti et al., Sourcebook on Violence Against Women  1–2
(2001); Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide:  Protecting Battered Parents and
Their Children in the Family Court System, 37 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 273
(1999).
3. Professionals from different disciplines have historically proffered
competing theoretical explanations of domestic violence.  See Joanna Miles,
Domestic Violence, in Family Law 81 (Jonathan Herring ed., 2001).  Advocates of
opposing theories disagree about issues such as whether domestic violence is
transmitted between generations and whether it escalates over time.  For discussion
of intra-individual and social psychological theories see Renzetti et al., supra note
2, at  6  (discussing intra-individual and social psychological theories such as social
learning theory, psychopathology, psychological and physiological explanations,
resource theory, and exchange theory); Richard J. Gelles, Intimate Violence in
Families 126–29 (1997) (discussing psychiatric/personality theory, social-
situational/stress and coping theory, social learning theory, and resource theory).
For discussion of sociocultural explanations see Renzetti et al., supra note 2, at
12–15  (discussing feminist theory, family violence theory, subculture of violence,
cultural acceptance of violence, and stress).
4. However, recently researchers have begun to develop comprehensive
multidimensional explanations of domestic violence that integrate different schools
of thought.  Rather than rehashing prior disputes, researchers are reframing issues
in an effort to accommodate (rather than disprove) a range of views.  See Renzetti
et al., supra note 2, at 15–17; Kristin L. Anderson, Gender, Status, and Domestic
Violence:  An Integration of Feminist and Family Violence Approaches, 59 Journal
of Marriage and the Family 655 (1997) (combining family violence and feminist
perspectives in research examining how structural inequality differentially
influences male and female violence); Sonia Miner Salari & Bret M Baldwin,
Verbal, Physical, and Iljurious Aggression Among Intimate Couples Over Time, 23
J. of Fam. Issues 523 (2002) (support for sociological, feminist, and psychological
theories in their study of abuse over time).  See also Lynn Magdol
II.  DIFFERENTIATING TYPES OF VIOLENCE
A.  Contradictory Research Suggests the Existence of Different
Types of Domestic Violence
Despite intense study, researchers, scholars, and practitioners fail
to agree upon the most basic facts about domestic violence.  This
state of affairs stems in part from the multi-disciplinary nature of
domestic violence.  Each professional group approaches the problem
from a different viewpoint using different sets of analytical tools.
Researchers focusing on one aspect of the problem may not grasp the
significalce of other research and professionals adhering to a
particular world view may have difficulty assimilating contrary
information from other schools of thought.   This has resulted in the2
creation of individual “silos” of information with no mechanism for
constructing a comprehensive view.   Unfortunately, oup knowledge3
about domestic violence reflects this fractured approach to the
problem.4
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et al., Gender Differences in Partner Violence in a Birth Cohort of 21-Year-Olds:
Bridging the Gap Between Clinical and Epidemiological Approaches, 65 Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 68, 76 (1997).  Magdol’s study of young
adults found that while more women were violent than men (supporting the family
conflict studies), the violent men had more deviant characteristics and their female
victims suffered more symptoms (consistent with the crime and clinical studies).
The authors suggest that these findings provide confirmation of both schools of
thought.  Id.
While much remains to be done, the integration of contrasting theories has
sparked creativity and brought new imagination to the study of domestic violence.
Susan L. Miller & Charles F. Wellford, Patterns and Correlates of Interpersonal
Violence, in Violence Between Intimate Partners 16 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1997).
Cross-disciplinary and multi-perspective collaborations hold promise for advancing
the struggle against domestic violence and ultimately benefitting children growing
up in violent homes.  Id.
5. Murray A. Straus, The Controversy Over Domestic Violence By Women,
in Intimate Relationships 17, 23 (Ximena  B. Arrias et al. eds., 1999) (family
conflict studies show annual assault rates of from 10 to  35%) [hereinafter Straus,
The Controversy].
6.  Kathleen J. Ferraro, Woman Battering:  More than a Family Problem, in
Women, Crime, and Criminal Justice 135, 137 (Claire Renzetti et al. eds. 2001)
(reports of use of violence against a partner was 12.1% for men and 11.6% for
women in the 1975 NFVS and 11.3% for men and 12.1% for women in the 1985
NFVS); Murray A. Straus, Physical Assaults by Wives, in Current Controversies on
Family Violence 67 (Richard J. Gelles et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Straus,
Physical Assaults].  See also Martin S. Fiebert & Denise M. Gonzalez, College
Women Who Initiate Assaults on Their Male Partners and the Reasons Offered for
Such Behavior, 80 Psychological Reports 583 (1997) (twenty-nine percent of
studied female college students admitted to physical aggression against male
partners).
7. Straus, The Controversy,  supra note 5, at 23 (National Crime Survey 0.2%,
National Crime Victim Survey 0.9%, police call data 0.2%).
8. Id. (Male to female ratios as follows: National Crime Survey, 13:1;
National Crime Victim Survey, 7:1; and police call data, 9:1).
Disquieting inconsistencies, as well as major contradictions, are
either ignored or become the subject of rancorous cross-professional
debate.  For example, for the past twenty-five years, researchers have
engaged in an intense debate concerning how often assaults occur and
whether men and women are equally violent.  The controversy stems
from the contradictory findings of various studies.  Epidemiological
“family conflict” studies show higher overall assault rates  with5
nearly equal rates of assault by men and women.   In contrast, so-6
called “crime” studies and police call data show lower overall annual
assault rates  and much higher rates of assault by men than by7
women.8
The “family conflict” studies have been criticized by service
providers and some feminist scholars who challenge the methodology
of the studies, particularly the use of reliance on the Conflict Tactics
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9. See Murray A. Straus & Sherry L. Hamby, The Revised Conflict Tactics
Scales,17 Journal of Family Issues 283, 287 (1996).  Family conflict researchers
counter that the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale measures psychological aggression,
sexual coercion and takes account of resulting injury.  Id.  See also Sujata Desai &
Linda E. Saltzman, Measurement Issues for Violence Against Women, in
Sourcebook on Violence Against Uomen 35, 43–49 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds.,
2001) (discussing measurement tools including the Abusive Behavior Inventory,
the Conflict Tactics Scales, the Conflict Tactics Scale 2, the Index of Spouse
Abuse, the Measure of Wife Abuse, Partner Abuse Scales, the Severity of Violence
Against Women Scales, the Sexual Experiences Survey, and the Women’s
Experience with Battering Scale).
10. Russell P. Dobash et al., The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence,
39 Social Problems 71, 77 (1992); Demie Kurz, Social Science Perspectives on
Wife Abuse: Current Debates and Future Directions, 3 Gender & Society 489, 491
(1989).  See also Lisa D. Brush, Violent Acts and Injurious Outcomes In Married
Couples: Methodological Issues in the National Survey of Families and
Households, 4 Gender & Society 56 (1990) (finding wives more likely to be injured
than husbands).
11. Gelles, supra note 3, at 93.  See also Brush, supra note 10, at 59.  National
Survey of Families and Households analysis shows that men and women both
commit violence acts but that women are more likely to be injured.  Id.
12. Straus, The Controversy, supra note 5, at 38.
13. Murray A. Straus is a Professor of Sociology and Co-Director of the Family
Research Laboratory at the University of New Hampshire.
14. Straus, Physical Assaults, supra note 6, at 77
15. Michael P. Johnson, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Sociology,
Women’s Studies, and African and African American Studies at Pennsylvania State
University.
Scale.   These critics believe that the studies focus too heavily on9
specific acts of aggression and too little on resulting injury and the
context of the behavior.   “However, both groups of researchers10
agree that women are ten times as likely as men to be injured as a
result of domestic violence.”   Differences also stem from11
definitional issues.  The family conflict researchers define domestic
violence narrowly in terms of physical assault, while service
providers and clinical researchers define it broadly to include all
types of maltreatment.12
In the final analysis, despite the high level of acrimony, these
studies may not actually contradict each other.  As Murray Straus13
explains, researchers may in fact be observing and measuring
different phenomena.  He asserts that both groups of researchers are
correct.  They are merely studying different populations experiencing
different types of violence.  He speculates that, “these two types of
violence probably have different etiologies and probably require
different types of intervention.”14
Researcher Michael P. Johnson  has taken the process of15
integrating competing studies to its conclusion by developing a
comprehensive typology that accounts for contradictory research and
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16. Michael P. Johnson & Kathleen J. Ferraro, Research on Domestic Violence
in the 1990s:  Making Distinctions, 62 Journal of Marriage and Family 948 (2000).
17. Id. at 3.  Johnson suggests a category of violence called Mutual Violent
Control which occurs when both the husband and the wife violently attempt to
control each other.  He theorizes that this type of violence is very rare; therefore,
this article does not discuss it.  Id.  But see Marilyn J. Kwong & Kim Bartholomew,
Gender Differences in Patterns of Relationship Violence in Alberta, 31 Canadian
Journal of Behavioural Science 150, 157 (1999) (describing patterns of violence
other than patriarchal terrorism or common couple violence).
18. Although other domestic violence typologies exist, the Johnson typology
was selected for use in this article because (1) it is empirically based, (2) it is
consistent with other related research, and (3) it comports with the author’s
observation of cases as a legal aid lawyer and a family mediator.
19. Michael P. Johnson & Janel M. Leone, The Differential Effects of Intimate
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings from the National Violence
Against Women Survey , available at http://www.personal.psu.edu/
faculty/m/p/mpj/JFI03.html.
20. Michael P. Johnson, Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and
Asymmetry in Domestic Violence, 11 available at http://www.personal.psu.edu/
faculty/m/p/mpj/02VAW.html [hereinafter Johnson, Symmetry].
connects contrasting perspectives.  Based on his analysis of the
“family conflict” and the “feminist” studies discussed above, he
concludes that women’s advocates and service providers are
primarily observing one type of domestic violence,  Intimate
Terrorism, while family conflict researchers are predominantly
measuring another type of violence, Situational Couple Violence.16
Johnson identifies four types of domestic violence based on the
motivation of the aggressor and the overall pattern of the violence.17
The two most common forms are Intimate Terrorism, which involves
an escalating pattern of coercive control, and Situational Couple
Violence, which involves isolated conflict-based incidents.  These
two forms are the subject of this article.  A third form, Violent
Resistance, which involves self-defense, will be discussed only as it
relates to Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence.18
The possibility that families experience different types of
violence has far reaching implications for policy and practice.
Johnson asserts that failure to recognize these differences makes
“much of the empirical domestic violence literature . . . virtually
meaningless.”   He argues that “all of our important questions about19
domestic violence may be different for the different forms of
violence:”20
The modeling of the causes and consequences of partner
violence will never be powerful as long as we aggregate
behaviors as disparate as a “feminine” slap in the face, a
terrorizing pattern of beatings accompanied by humiliating
psychological abuse, an argument that escalates into a mutual
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21. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 19.
22. Jerome R. Kolbo et al., Children Who Witness Domestic Violence:  A
Review of the Empirical Literature, 11 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 281, 283
(1996).
23. Jeffrey L. Edleson, Should Childhood Exposure to Adult Domestic Violence
Be Defined as Child Maltreatment Under the Law?, in Protecting Children from
Domestic Violence 8, 10 (Peter G. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004).
24. Id. at 11; Kolbo, supra note 22, at 288; Edleson, supra note 23, at 11.
25. Lundy Bancroft & Jay G. Silverman, The Batterer As Parent 42 (2002)
(finding 40-70% percent report concurrent child abuse); Evan Stark & Anne
Flitcraft, Women at Risk 76 (1996) (discussing relationship between domestic
violence and child abuse).
26. Lundy Bancroft is an author, trainer, counselor, and activist on issues of
abuse and recovery.  Jay G. Silverman, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Society,
Human Development, and Health at the Harvard School of Public Health.
27. Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 25, at 103–05.
28. Jeffrey L. Edleson, Ph.D., is a Professor at the University of Minnesota,
School of Social Work and Director of the Minnesota Center Against Violence and
Abuse.
shoving match, or a homicide committed by a person who
feels there is no other way to save her own life.21
B.  Policy Implications:  Children May Be Exposed to Different
Types of Domestic Violence
Researchers agree that children who witness domestic violence
are harmed emotionally and their behavior is affected.   Not22
surprisingly these children may be more aggressive and antisocial or
they may be more fearful and inhibited than other children.  They
also show higher anxiety levels, more depression, and symptoms of
trauma.   Additionally, there is some indication that they suffer23
social, cognitive, and physical effects as well.   They are also more24
likely to be physically abused.25
These children may have special needs that should be considered
in connection with custody and parenting-time decisions.  Bancroft
and Silverman  suggest six circumstances that promote healing.26
First, children need an environment that provides physical and
emotional safety.  Second, they require structure, appropriate limits,
and a sense of predictability.  Third, they benefit from a strong bond
with the nonperpetrating parent. Fourth, they need to be relieved of
the burden of caring for adults.  Fifth, they may prefer to have some
limited contact with the perpetrator if such contact is safe.  Sixth,
they benefit from the opportunity to reestablish relationships with
siblings.27
However, as Jeffery Edleson  explains, “the available research28
reveals a great deal of variability in children’s experiences and the
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29. Edleson, supra note 23, at 11; Janis Wolak & David Finkelhor, Children
Exposed to Partner Violence, in Partner Violence 73, 80 (Jana L. Jasinski et al.
eds., 1998).
30. Amy Holtzworth-Munroe et al., A Brief Review of the Research on
Husband Violence, 2 Aggression and Violent Behavior 179, 199–201 (1997).  See
also Edleson, supra note 23, at 11 (factors include the level of violence, child’s
degree of exposure, other stressors, harm for each child, and child’s resilience);
Kolbo, supra note 22, 290 (mediating factors include frequency and duration of
abuse, whether the abuse was physical and verbal, whether the child was abused,
age, gender, maternal stress, and family disadvantage).
31. Peter G. Jaffe et al., Protecting Children from Domestic Violence 31–37
(2004) (finding effects on children of various ages).  See also Robert E. Emery &
Lisa Laumann-Billings, An Overview of the Nature, Causes, and Consequences of
Abusive Family Relationships, 53 American Psychologist 121, 128 (1998)
(discussing five classes of variables related to the consequences of victimization).
32. Holtzworth-Munroe et al., supra note 30, at 201–205.  See also Joan B.
Kelly & Robert E. Emery, Children’s Adjustment Following Divorce:  Risk and
Resilience Perspectives, 52 Family Relations 352 (2003) (children’s adjustment to
divorce generally); Joan B. Kelly,  Children’s Adjustment in Conflicted Marriage
and Divorce:  A Decade Review of Research, 39 J. Am. Acad. Child Adolesc.
Psychiatry 963 (2000) (research on children’s adjustment to divorce generally).
33. But see Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service
Caseload: Developing an Appropriate Response, 23 Women’s Rts. L. Rep. 107,
116 (2002) (finding children who witness violence at no greater risk than children
in distressed relationships with no violence).
34. Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 25, at 39.
35. Emery & Laumann-Billings, supra note 31, at 121 (arguing for
differentiation between family maltreatment and family violence).
impact of those experiences on a child.”   Consequently, researchers29
have identified various factors that influence the impact that
witnessing abuse has upon children.  Some factors relate to the
marital conflict, such as marital violence (as opposed to distress), the
intensity of the conflict, the frequency of the conflict, whether the
conflict is resolved, and the child’s awareness of the conflict.   Other30
factors, such as the child’s gender and age, influence the ultimate
impact of witnessing domestic violence.   The existence of other31
stressors such as concurrent child abuse or maternal depression can
increase the child’s level of distress, while “buffers” such as outside
support can act as protective factors.32
Although the literature in this area does not generally distinguish
among types of violence, it is likely that the impact on children varies
based on the type of violence the family experiences.   This idea is33
consistent with evidence that violent conflict is more harmful to
children than high levels of nonviolent conflict  and the work of34
Emery and Laumann-Billings which makes distinctions among child
abuse cases for the purpose of intervention.   Some have speculated35
that the extent to which domestic violence and child abuse occur
concurrently may be explained by the underlying dynamic of
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36. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 25, at 78.
37. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 17 (Situational Couple Violence (SC
V) was previously called Common Couple Violence (CCV) in Johnson’s typology).
38. Id. at 3.  But see Kwong & Bartholomew, supra  note 17, at 157
(descriptions of patterns of violence other than patriarchal terrorism or common
couple violence).
39. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 4.
40. Janel M. Leone et al., Consequences of Male Partner Violence for Low-
Income Minority Women, 66 Journal of Marriage and Family 472, 473 (2004); Evan
Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering:  From Battered Women Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 Albany L. Rev. 973, 1017 (1995) (discussing “tangential
spouse abuse” as an extension of coercive control); Angela Browne, Violence in
Marriage:  Until Death Do Us Part?, in Violence Between Intimate Partners 48,
56–60 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1997) (early warning signs include intrusion,
isolation, possession, jealousy, prone to anger, history of violence).
coercive control  found in cases of Intimate Terrorism.36
Consequently, with respect to children, Johnson queries whether
“exposure to Intimate Terrorism might in fact have powerful effects
that are muted by their aggregation with the effects of Situational
Couple Violence.”37
C.  Viewing Domestic Violence Through the Lens of the Johnson
Typology
Johnson identifies types of domestic violence based on the
motivation of the aggressor and the overall pattern of the violence.38
The types considered in this article are Intimate Terrorism,
Situational Couple Violence, and, to a lesser extent, Violent
Resistance.
1.  Intimate Terrorism
a.  The Johnson Typology:  Intimate Terrorism
Intimate Terrorism (IT) is the type of violence observed in
battered women’s shelters and measured by crime and clinical
studies. In Intimate Terrorism, violence is one tactic in a larger
pattern of power and control.   Control is exerted by making threats,39
wielding economic control, applying privilege and punishment,
manipulating and threatening children, isolating the victim, and
inflicting emotional and sexual abuse.   As compared with other40
types of violence, Intimate Terrorism involves more frequent per
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41. Michael P. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence:
Two Forms of Violence Against Women, 7 Journal of Marriage and the Family 283,
286 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism].
42. Id. at 287.
43. Leone et al., supra note 40, at 48; Michael P. Johnson, Two Types of
Violence Against Women in the American Family:  Identifying Patriarchal
T e r r o r i s m  a n d  C o m m o n  C o u p l e  V i o l e n c e ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t
http://www.personal/psu.edu/faculty/m/p/mpj/ncfr99paper.html [hereinafter
Johnson, Two Types].
44. Johnson, Two Types, supra note 43, at 29 (75% escalated).
45. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism , supra note 41, at 285 (97% percent
assaults on wives); Glenda Kaufman Kantor & Jana L. Jasinski, Dynamics and Risk
Factors in Partner Violence, in Partner Violence 1, 10 (Jana L. Jasinski et al. eds.,
1998) (no evidence in the literature describes systematic victimization by women
on men).
46. Leone et al., supra note 40, at 475; Johnson, Symmetry, supra note 20, at
23.
47. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 15  (two-thirds leave); Johnson,
Symmetry, supra note 20, at 13.
48. Leone et al., supra note 40, at 486.
49. Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Women 56 (1979).
50. Desmond Ellis & Noreen Stuckless, Mediating and Negotiating Marital
Conflicts 2 (1996).
51. Janet R. Johnston & Linda Campbell, Parent-child Relationships in
Domestic Violence Families Disputing Custody, 31 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev.
282, 286–87 (1993); Janet R. Johnston & Linda E. G. Campbell, A Clinical
Typology of Interpersonal Violence in Disputed-Custody Divorces, 6 Amer. J.
Orthopsychiat. 190 (1993).
couple incidents,  more severe violence,  and results in more serious41 42
injury.   This type of violence is quite likely to escalate over time.43 44
Intimate Terrorism is nearly always perpetrated by men upon
women,  and female victims are more likely to suffer from Post45
Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD), depression, and poor health.46
These women actively seek formal help and are likely to leave the
abuser.   Intimate Terrorism accounts for somewhere between eleven47
percent and thirty-five percent of domestic violence situations.48
b.  Research and Theory Consistent with Intimate Terrorism
Other researchers  have also identified this pattern of abusive
control.  Lenore Walker first described it as the “cycle of violence”
in the late 1970s.   Ellis and Stuckless refer to it as “control49
instigated abuse”  and Johnston and Campbell describe it as50
“ongoing and episodic male battering.”51
i.  Victims of Intimate Terrorism
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52. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 15.
53. Note that some survivors of domestic abuse reject use of the term “battered
women” because it defines them in terms of the abuse.  See Melanie Randall,
Domestic Violence and the Construction of “Ideal Victims”:  Assaulted Women’s
“Image Problems” in Law, 23 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 107, 145 (2004).
54. Lenore E. A. Walker, The Battered Women Syndrome Is a Psychological
Consequence of Abuse, in Current Controversies on Family Violence 133–37
(Richard J. Gelles et al. eds., 1993).  Note that contrary to popular perception,
Walker does not use the term “learned helplessness” to mean that victims behave
in a helpless way.  Rather she uses it to mean that victims learn that they “cannot
predict whether what they do will result in a particular outcome.”  Id.; Stark, Re-
representing, supra note 40, at 974–75.
55. Stark, Re-representing, supra note 40, at 974–75.
56. Phyllis W. Sharps & Jacquelyn Campbell, Health Consequences for
Victims of Violence in Intimate Relationships, in Intimate Relationships 163, 166
(Ximena B. Arriaga et al. eds., 1999).
57. Stark, supra note 33, at 111. 
58. Angela Browne et al., The Impact of Recent Partner Violence on Poor
Women’s Capacity to Maintain Work, 5 Violence Against Women 393 (1999).
59. Angela Browne & Shari S. Bassuk, Intimate Violence in the Lives of
Homeless and Poor Housed Women, 67 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 261
(1997).
60. Tracy Bennett Herbert et al., Coping With an Abusive Relationship: How
and Why Do Women Stay?, 53 Journal of Marriage and the Family 311 (1991)
(65.6% no longer in relationship).  But see Jean Gile-Sims, The Aftermath of
Partner Violence, in Partner Violence 65 (Jana L. Jasinski et al. eds., 1998) (half
of battered women from shelters return to relationship).
61. Gelles, supra note 3, at 87, 88.
62. Lee H. Bowker, A Battered Woman’s Problems Are Social, Not
Psychological, in Current Controversies on Family Violence 154, 155 (Richard J.
Gelles et al. eds., 1993).
While most research regarding victims of domestic violence does
not explicitly distinguish between Intimate Terrorism and Situational
Couple Violence, much of the research seems focused on female
victims of Intimate Terrorism.   The most commonly held view of52
“battered women”  is based on “the traumatization model” which53
includes themes such as “learned helplessness” and “battered
women’s syndrome.”   Some women who are victims of Intimate54
Terrorism suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of
the abuse.   Victims experience painful and serious physical55
injuries,  as well as depression, PTSD, suicide attempts, and56
substance abuse.  Victimization is also related to difficulty57
maintaining employment  and a permanent residence.58 59
However, contrary to popular belief, many victims of domestic
violence leave the violent relationship.   In fact, Richard Gelles60
reports that women who experience the most frequent and severe
violence (arguably victims of Intimate Terrorism) are more likely to
leave.   This is consistent with research demonstrating victims’ use61
of a “vast array of personal strategies and help resources.”   For62
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63. Such personal strategies include talking to or avoiding their partner, hiding
or running away, threatening to call police or file for divorce, or fighting back
physically.  Id. at 155–56.
64. Bowker, supra note 62, at 155–56.  Informal and formal resources include
police, clergy, physicians, and lawyers.  Id.
65. Gelles, supra note 3, at 87, 89.
66. Bowker, supra note 62, at 160.
67. Donald G. Dutton, The Abusive Personality (1998) (suggesting three types
of batterers:  overcontrolled, generally violent (psychopathic); and borderline or
cyclical); Donald G. Dutton & Susan K. Golant, The Batterer (1995); Donald G.
Dutton & Andrew J. Starzomski, Borderline Personality in Perpetrators of
Psychological and Physical Abuse, 8 Violence and Victims 327 (1993).  For a
comparison of batterer typologies, see Amy Holtzworth-Munroe & Gregory L.
example, in one study, researcher Lee Bowker found that women
used seven personal strategies (such as talking to or avoiding their
partner, hiding or running away, threatening to call police or file
divorce, or fighting back physically)  to end the abuse, after which63
they accessed informal and formal resources (including police,
clergy, physicians, and lawyers).   Victims, therefore, are not64
necessarily passive but may be active survivors of abuse.   As65
Bowker explains:
Their vast diversity as unique individuals implies that they
will experience a very wide range of reactions to abuse.  All
battered women will react to the abuse they suffer, but not all
will develop symptoms that fit the pattern of the battered
woman syndrome.  Furthermore, some of the women who do
develop BWS symptoms experience the symptoms for only a
short time. It is important to realize that most battered women
begin to recover from these symptoms as soon as they (and
their children, if there are any) are safe.66
Nevertheless, victims of Intimate Terrorism are more likely to be
traumatized than are victims of Situational Couple Violence.  Early
identification of Intimate Terrorism would assist professionals in
connecting these victims to services such as emergency shelter,
medical care, legal protection, and emotional support.  Victims of
Intimate Terrorism need comprehensive safety planning, especially
around the time of separation when the perpetrator’s need to control
may escalate.
ii.  Perpetrators of Intimate Terrorism
Like the research on victims, the research regarding perpetrators
of domestic violence does not distinguish between types of violence.
However, researchers have previously developed typologies of male
batterers that are consistent with Johnson’s framework.67
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Stuart, Typologies of Male Batterers:  Three Subtypes and the Differences Among
Them , 116 Psychological Bulletin 476, 492 (1994).
68. Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, Ph.D., is a Professor of Psychology at Indiana
University.
69. Gregory Stuart, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Human
Behavior at Brown University.
70. Amy Holtzworth-Munroe et al., A Typology of Male Batterers, in Violence
in Intimate Relationships 45, 46 (Ximena B. Arriga et al. eds., 1999).
71. Id. at 46.
72. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 67, at 492. 
73. Id.at 482.
74. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 5.
75. Holtzworth-Munroe et al., supra note 71, at 46–47.
76. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 67, at 476.
77. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 5.
Holtzworth-Munroe  and Stuart  differentiate male perpetrators68 69
based on the severity of the abuse, whether the perpetrator is violent
outside of the family, and the perpetrator’s psycho pathology or
personality disorders.  They suggest three types of batterers, two of
which are consistent with Intimate Terrorism and one consistent with
Situational Couple Violence.
Dysphoric/borderline perpetrators inflict moderate to severe
abuse with psychological and sexual aspects.  These batterers have
borderline personalities, are likely to have substance abuse problems,
and difficulty controlling their “explosive anger.”  They are70
primarily violent at home but may engage in some other criminal
behavior.   These men are impulsive, fear abandonment, and have71
hostile attitudes toward women.   Holtzman-Munroe and Stuart72
believe that dysphoric/borderline perpetrators make up twenty-five
percent of batterers.   Johnson asserts that this type of perpetrator is73
involved in Intimate Terrorism.74
Generally violent/antisocial batterers inflict moderate to severe
abuse that includes psychological and sexual abuse.  They are likely
to exhibit antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy.  These
perpetrators usually have a history of involvement with the law.75
They exhibit negative attitudes toward women.   Holtzman-Munroe76
and Stuart suggest that generally violent/antisocial batterers
constitute twenty-five percent of batterers. Johnson concludes that
they are involved in Intimate Terrorism.77
Most of the literature and research on perpetrators is focused on
the traits of perpetrators who engage in Intimate Terrorism.  For
example, Bancroft and Silverman limit their discussion of batterers
to those with a pattern of exercising coercive control over a female
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78. Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 25, at 3  (defining the term batterer and
noting that “by contrast, violence that is primarily annoying (as opposed to
intimidating) and that is not accompanied by a pattern of coercion will not be
considered here”).
79. Id.at 5–19.  See also James Ptacek, The Tactics and Strategies of Men Who
Batter, in Violence Between Intimate Partners 104 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1997)
(discussing report of tactics by men and strategies of women).
80. Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 25, at 30–31.
81. Id. at 31.
82. Id. at 32–33.
83. Id. at 33–34.
84. Id. at 34–35.
victim.  They define characteristics of batterers as including the78
following:
1.  imposition of a pattern of control;
2.  attitude of entitlement;
3.  selfishness and self-centeredness; 
4.  feeling of superiority; 
5.  possessiveness;
6.  confusion of love and abuse;
7.  manipulativeness;
8.  contradictory behavior;
9.  externalization of responsibility;  and
    10.  denial, minimization, and victim blaming.79
Not surprisingly, these traits have serious implications for parenting.
iii.  Intimate Terrorists as Parents
Bancroft and Silverman delineate typical parental characteristics
of batterers.  As noted above, they focus their discussion on batterers
who engage in coercive control or under Johnson’s typology,
Intimate Terrorism.  First, these fathers are likely to be rigidly
authoritarian.  They expect to be obeyed without question, are highly
irritable, show little empathy for children, and spank children more
than twice as often.   Second, battering fathers tend to be under-80
involved parents who view children as an annoying hindrance and are
unwilling to accommodate their needs.   This pattern of neglect may81
be punctuated with brief periods of fatherly interest in the children
during which he will attempt to win their favor.   Third, batterers82
continually undermine the parenting efforts of the mother by
ridiculing her, overruling her decisions, and physically attacking
her.   Finally, battering fathers tend to be self-centered, viewing the83
children as extensions of themselves and believing that the children
should meet their needs.84
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87. Stark, Re-Presenting, supra note 40, at 1017–18.
88. Id.
89. Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 25, at 105.
90. Id. at 106.
91. Linda Neilson, Assessing Mutual Partner-Abuse Claims in Child Custody
and Access Cases, 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 411, 414 (2004); Cynthia Grover Hastings,
Letting Down Their Guard: What Guardians Ad Litem Should Know About
Domestic Violence in Child Custody Disputes, 24 B. C. Third World L.J. 283, 303
(2004); Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 Am. U. J.
Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 657, 685 (2003); Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to
Protect Children in High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 495,
513 (2001).
92. Nancy K. D. Lemon, Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against
Custody to Batterers:  How Effective Are They?, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 601, 608
(2001); Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?:
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 St. Louis
U. Pub. L. Rev. 7, 28 (2004); Sarah M. Buel, Domestic Violence and the Law:  An
Impassioned Exploration for Family Peace, 33 Fam. L. Q. 719, 735 (1999).
93. Goodmark, supra note 92, at 34; Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 25, at
125.
Cycles of terror and kindness can lead to traumatic bonding with
the battering parent.  The child may crave positive contact with the
batterer and be unable to separate love and abuse.  Children may
conclude that their safety depends upon sustaining close ties with the
batterer.85
Evan Stark  describes the batterer’s extension of coercive tactics86
to the children as “tangential spouse abuse.”   Batterers are able to87
control the mother by manipulating or threatening the children, even
after divorce.   Unfortunately, fathers with a history of Intimate88
Terrorism are also likely to continue their previous inappropriate
parenting practices after divorce.89
Bancroft and Silverman discuss typical post-divorce relationships
between perpetrators and children.  In some cases, the perpetrator has
little or no contact with the children.  However, in other cases, the
perpetrator seeks involvement with the children in a continued effort
to manipulate and control.   Various studies and articles chronicle90
the extent to which perpetrators of domestic violence (presumably
Intimate Terrorism) use the court system to coerce and control the
victim.  For example, they are more likely than other fathers to seek
custody of the children  and there is indication that more often than91
not, they are awarded custody.   They also file harassing motions,92
make false allegations, and manipulate the process by engaging in
parallel actions.   In court, the batterer is likely to project a93
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94. Goodmark, supra note 92, at 34; Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 25, at
122–26.
95. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 4.
96. Id. at 15.
97. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism , supra note 41, at 285.  But see Robert M.
Milardo, Gender Asymmetry in Common Couple Violence, 5 Personal Relationships
423 (1998) (higher rates of female aggression).
98. Milardo, supra note 97, at 434; Sally A. Lloyd & Beth C. Emery, The Dark
Side of Courtship 61 (2000); Renzetti et al., supra note 2, at 440  (highlighting need
to consider motivation and meaning).
99. Kristin L. Anderson, Perpetrator or Victim? Relationships Between
Intimate Partner Violence and Well-Being, 64 Journal of Marriage and Family 851,
861 (2002) (“Although men and women report similar rates of intimate partner
violence perpetration and victimization, the negative consequences of intimate
partner violence are more likely to be experienced by women.”); Dina Vivian &
Jennifer Langhinrichsen-Rohling, Are Bi-Directionally Violent Copules Mutually
Victimized? A Gender-Sensitive Comparison, 9 Violence and Victims 107, 118
(1994) (even if aggression is bi-directional, wives are affected more negatively).
100. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra note 41, at 286; Johnson & Ferraro,
nonabusive image and present himself as the parent most willing to
cooperate and communicate.   Thus, in cases of Intimate Terrorism,94
the primary needs of children are safety and protection from the
perpetrator.
2.  Situational Couple Violence
a.  The Johnson Typology:  Situational Couple Violence
Situational Couple Violence (SCV) occurs in the context of a
specific disagreement that spirals into a violent incident; it is an
isolated reaction to conflict and does not involve a larger pattern of
power and control.  Situational Couple Violence generally involves
fewer per couple incidents than Intimate Terrorism, and the violence
is generally less severe and less likely to result in injury.   It is95
important to note, however, that Situational Couple Violence is not
simply a milder form of Intimate Terrorism.  Situational Couple
Violence can involve severe violence; however, the violence is not
part of a larger pattern of control.96
Situational Couple Violence is the type of domestic violence
measured in the epidemiological “family conflict” studies, and it is
initiated nearly equally by men and women.   However, there is97
evidence that men and women are differently motivated  and that98
women suffer more injury and negative consequences resulting from
the violence.  These consequences include higher levels of
depression, low self-esteem, and substance abuse.   This type of99
violence usually does not escalate and may in fact de-escalate or stop
altogether.   Situational Couple Violence is the most common form100
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103. Noreen Stuckless is the Undergraduate Director for the Department of
Psychology at York University.
104. Ellis & Stuckless, supra note 50, at 34.
105. Johnston & Campbell, supra note 51, at 292  .
106. Goodmark, supra note 92, at 7.
107. See Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 25, at 170  (contrasting “the vast majority
of domestic violence episodes” involving “relatively minor acts…rather than severe
violence.”).
108. Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Ph.D., is the Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs
and Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Nursing.  
109. Linda Rose, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor at the Johns Hopkins School
of Nursing.
110. Joan Kub, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of
Nursing.
111. Daphne Nedd, Ph.D., is an Assistant Clinical Professor in the College of
Nursing at Wayne State University.
112. Jacquelyn Campbell et al., Voices of Strength and Resistance, 13 Journal
of Interpersonal Violence 743, 751, 759 (1998); See also Kathleen J. Ferraro,
Battered Women:  Strategies for Survival, in Violence Between Intimate Partners
124 (Albert P. Cardarelli ed., 1997) (describes stages of leaving a violent
of domestic violence accounting for an estimated fifty-one percent of
cases.101
b.  Research and Theory Consistent with Situational Couple
Violence
Other researchers have also identified this pattern of domestic
violence.  Ellis  and Stuckless  identify Situational Couple102 103
Violence as “conflict instigated violence,”  while Johnston and104
Campbell label it “male-controlling interactive violence.”105
i.  Victims of Situational Couple Violence
There is a common assumption that all victims of domestic
violence should want to leave their relationships.  Obviously, many
should and do leave, including some victims of Situational Couple
Violence.  However, others want to live safely in their current
relationships, seeking only an end to the violence.   As compared to106
victims of Intimate Terrorism, victims of Situational Couple Violence
are more likely to voluntarily choose to work on the relationship
rather than leave it.   Campbell,  Rose,  Kub,  and Nedd107 108 109 110 111
suggest that victims engage in “a process of achieving nonviolence,”
which includes negotiating with the partner and implementing
strategies to end the violence;   this research is likely to apply to112
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relationship).
113. At the time of the study, Paul Miller, Mary M. Caldwell, and Ruth Ann
Belknap were associated with the College of Nursing at Wayne State University.
114. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Relationship Status of Batterred Women Over
Time, 9 Journal of Family Violence 99 (1994).
115. Of these, half were in new relationships and half in the same relationship
but violence-free for one year.
116. Campbell et al., supra note 114, at 105.
117. See discussion about the dynamics of Situational Couple Violence supra.
118. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 5.
119. Holtzworth-Munroe et al., supra note 70, at 46.
120. Id. at 47.
121. Holtzworth-Munroe & Stuart, supra note 67, at 492.
victims of Situational Couple Violence.  Similarly, Campbell, Miller,
Cardwell, and Belknap  found that after two and one-half years,113
only twenty-five percent of battered women were still being
abused.   Forty-seven percent were in a relationship with no114
violence (half were in new relationships and half in the same
relationship, but violence free for one year),  and twenty percent115
had left the abuser but not entered into another relationship.   One116
might speculate that victims in relationships that became free of
violence for at least one year were more likely to have been victims
of Situational Couple Violence.
Relatively fewer services are available to victims who choose to
stay in their relationships.  However,  these couples could benefit
from monitoring and enhancement of their conflict resolution skills.
Such support would also be beneficial to Situational Couple Violence
victims who decide to leave the relationship.  Thought should also be
given to the reality that some of the victims of Situational Couple
Violence are men.  Even though female victims of Situational Couple
Violence are more likely to experience injury and other detrimental
effects than are male victims,  some male victims might seek117
supportive services.
ii.  Perpetrators of Situational Couple Violence
Johnson believes that one of the Holtzworth-Munroe and Stuart
batterer types, family-only perpetrators, are involved in Situational
Couple Violence.   These family-only perpetrators inflict less severe118
violence with less psychological and sexual abuse.  They evidence
little or no psycho pathology and are usually not violent outside the
home.   Their violence results from stress, anger, and lack of119
relationship skills such that a marital conflict becomes violent.  Their
violence is not likely to escalate over time,  and they generally have120
positive attitudes toward women.   Holtzworth-Munroe and Stuart121
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122. Id. at 482.
123. Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 25, at 106.
124. Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes:
From Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U.
Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 395, 419–20 (2000).
hypothesize that family-only perpetrators make up fifty percent of
violent men.122
iii.  Situational Couple Violence and Parenting
Bancroft and Silverman report that some perpetrators parent quite
responsibly after divorce, leading one to speculate that these are cases
of Situational Couple Violence rather than Intimate Terrorism.
According to them, these fathers did not undermine the mother or use
the children against her during the marriage.  They were less
psychologically abusive, they accepted the termination of the
relationship, and they showed the ability to elevate the children’s
needs over their own.  After five years, their former partners
reported few problems.   If indeed these were cases of Situational123
Couple Violence, this is an indication that carefully structured
parenting plans may work in such situations and that ongoing
contact with both parents would be in the children’s best interest.
As Andrew Schepard explains:
Conflict instigated violence is certainly not admirable and
has serious negative consequences for children and parents.
It may not, however, be as dangerous for both parents to
have a continuing relationship with the children requiring
parental contact as when control instigated violence is the
problem.  Perpetrators of conflict instigated violence may be
able to learn to resolve conflict more peacefully than those
who use violence as part of a pattern of control. Control
instigated violence seems far more based in deeply rooted
character and personality traits that are far less amenable to
positive intervention.124
In cases involving Situational Couple Violence, children remain
at risk but are likely to benefit from parental education regarding the
impact of high conflict on children and enhanced conflict resolution
skills.  Evan Stark concurs in this assessment:
Common Couple Violence [Situational Couple Violence] In
many relationships, one or both adults use force in ways that
they view as legitimate to address perceived differences in
power or to resolve conflicts.  If children are hurt by so-
called “common couple violence,” this is almost always
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125. Stark, supra note 33, at 123.
126. Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 16, at 4; Johnson, Two Types, supra note 43,
at 28 (Violent Resistance is 96.1% female).
127. Ronet Bachman & Dianne Carmody, Fighting Fire with Fire The Effects
of Victim Resistance in Intimate Versus Stranger Perpetrated Assaults Against
Females, 9 J. of Fam. Violence 317 (1994); Gile-Sims, supra note 60, at 54.
128. Vivian & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, supra note 99, at 120.
inadvertent, and the risk of their experiencing psychological
trauma is small, though modeling is a concern.  Typically,
both partners involved in this dynamic benefit from
culturally sensitive counseling focused on anger
management, conflict resolution, and information on
potential risks to children.125
Thus, the type of violence has a direct bearing on a perpetrator’s
ability to parent, the extent of harm to children, and potentially, the
prognosis for perpetrator change.
iv.  Violent Resistance
Violent Resistance involves situations where a female victim
defends herself against her aggressive male partner.   In one study,126
researchers found that victims who resist violence, either physically
or verbally, were twice as likely to be injured.127
While some perpetrators of Situational Couple Violence are
female, they must be carefully distinguished from women who are
violent resisters of Intimate Terrorism. Confusing a woman
defending herself from Intimate Terrorism with a woman perpetrator
of Situational Couple Violence could be a deadly mistake for her and
her children.  A woman resisting Intimate Terrorism (and her
children) needs immediate protection, not anger management
techniques.  The possibility of such a mistake illustrates a danger
inherent in the creation and use of typologies. At the same time, “a
monolithic etiological model of marital aggression is inadequate to
capture the diversity of relationship and individual dynamics in
physically aggressive marriages.”128
D.  The Need for Additional Research
The two most common forms of domestic violence, Intimate
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence, are dissimilar in a
number of respects.  Yet, in literature and in practice, distinctions are
rarely made between them.  As Johnson concludes:
Yes, all family violence is abhorrent, but not all family
violence is the same.  If there are different patterns that arise
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129. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra note 41, at 293.
130. Edna Erez & Tammy A. King, Patriarchal Terrorism or Common Couple
Violence:  Attorneys’ Views of Prosecuting and Defending Woman Batterers, 7
International Review of Victimology 207 (1997).
from different societal roots and interpersonal dynamics, we
must make distinctions in order to maximize our
effectiveness in moving toward the goal of peace in our
society.129
Additional research is needed in order to verify the existence of
different types of domestic violence, to better understand the
underlying dynamics, and to create tools for distinguishing types of
violence.  Until this occurs, typologies can lend insight into some
violent relationships but substantial caution must be exercised in
applying them in practice.
III.  USING DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT TO MATCH
FAMILIES WITH APPROPRIATE COURT PROCEDURES AND SERVICES
For too long, courts and legislatures have taken a one-size-fits-all
approach to domestic violence and very real differences among
families have been overlooked.  As a result of this lack of scrutiny,
the most acute cases (arguably those involving Intimate Terrorism)
are not taken seriously enough, resulting in batterers being given
unrestricted access to children and sometimes even custody.  At the
same time, in other cases (potentially those involving Situational
Couple Violence) families are discouraged from accessing services,
such as parent education and mediation which would be helpful to
them.  Families experiencing domestic violence are in need of special
care and handling, and it is time for professionals from all disciplines
to work together to provide it, rather than shaking their heads over
the complexity and intransigence of the problem.
A.  Current Failure to Differentiate Cases Involving Different
Types of Domestic Violence
1.  Misidentifying Cases:  All Domestic Violence Viewed as
Situational Couple Violence
The extent to which cases of Intimate Terrorism are mistakenly
viewed as Situational Couple Violence is illustrated in a 1997 study
of how prosecuting and defending attorneys handle domestic violence
cases.   Even though a number of the cases involved  Intimate130
Terrorism, they were mischaracterized as involving Situational
Couple Violence:
1400 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
131. Id. at 224.
132. Id. at 222–23.
133. Id. at 224.
134. Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York’s Children:  An Argument for the
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of a Child, 60 Albany L. Rev. 1345, 1359 (1997) (judges trivialize domestic abuse);
Meier, supra note 91, at 672 (victims treated as “hysterical and unreasonable” and
award joint custody); Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, The Family, and The
Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 Fam.
L. Q. 247, 257 (1993) (victims viewed as unstable and less fit to have custody);
Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias At the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of
State Task Forces, 6 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 1, 58 (1996) (judges
presume that victim provoked violence).
The study suggests that attorneys’ discourse of women
battering reflects batterers’ accounts of battering, and
portrays intimate violence that reaches the court, by and
large, as common couple violence [previous name for
Situational Couple Violence]. Victims’ battering experiences,
which are likely to reflect patriarchal terrorism [previous
name for Intimate Terrorism], are denied, minimized, or at
best referred to as a few “true” or “real” cases of domestic
violence.131
Defense attorneys reported that their most effective strategy was to
depict cases aq involving “mutual combat” and to attack the
credibility and sincerity of the victim.  Women were often portrayed
as using the system to “get even.”  When women were reluctant to
cooperate in prosecution, attorneys attributed this to a desire to
preserve her family while the victims listed fear of the batterer as the
most important reason.   The authors of the study conclude that “to132
accomplish a meaningful change in court practices and outcomes, the
cultural belief system underlying them must change.”133
The tendency to view all cases of domestic violence as Situational
Couple Violence takes place in family court as well as in criminal
cases.   As will be discussed in later sections, this propensity is134
encouraged by statutory definitions that target Situational Couple
Violence rather than Intimate Terrorism.  The failure to understand
the dynamic of coercive control present in Intimate Terrorism places
victims and children in extreme danger and discourages them from
seeking help.  At the same time, hesitancy to acknowledge the
existence of Situational Couple Violence allows the
mischaracterization of cases to continue and is used by some to
justify it.  All cases of domestic violence are “real,” but they should
not all be handled the same way.
2.  Lack of Formalized Screening
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325 (1997).
Professionals from all disciplines agree that screening for the
presence of domestic violence is a vital first step in protecting victims
and children.  Fortunately, a number of excellent screening tools have
been developed for the purpose of risk assessment and to aid in safety
planning.   However, because victims are hesitant to disclose135
domestic violence, it is dangerous to rely on a single method of
screening.   Consequently, professionals must continually monitor136
for indications of domestic violence. In this regard, screening is more
of an art than a science.  In addition to identifying violent behavior,
professionals must watch and listen carefully for evidence of
domination and control.   Screening devices could and should be137
revised to assist in distinguishing between Intimate  Terrorism and
Situational Couple Violence.138
Unfortunately, in many court systems no particular person or
agency is specifically charged with screening for domestic violence.
Pleadings were never designed to act as a screening device, but courts
lack other ways to identify cases of domestic violence unless a
protective order is sought.  Many parties are pro se,  and even if139
represented, there is no guarantee that the attorney is aware of the
violence.  Furthermore, research indicates that twenty percent of
mediators do not formally screen for abuse and that separate
screening interviews are used even less frequently.140
The lack of awareness of the existence of domestic violence may
not be remedied later in the divorce process.  Ann Freedman has
drawn attention to the “troubling inadequacy of fact-finding resources
in civil domestic violence proceedings, particularly in cases involving
1402 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
141. Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases:
Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses,  11 Am.
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Analysis and Recommendations § 2.05(2)(f) (2002).
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(2001).  See also Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning An Interdisciplinary Framework for
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S. Cal. L. Rev. 469  (1998) (discussion of various state approaches); Carolyn D.
Schwarz, Unified Family Courts: A Saving Grace for Victims of Domestic Violence
Living in Nations with Fragmented Court Systems, 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 304, 315–16
(2004) (Oregon, Hawaii, D.C.).
children.”   She attributes this to high case volumes; increasing141
numbers of pro se litigants; the complex nature of the issues; legal
maneuvering by the perpetrator; unclear social priorities; and judicial
preconceptions and beliefs.   Others have similarly commented on142
the disheartening tendency of courts to “throw up their hands in
despair” and characterize cases as “he said, she said.”143
Thus, in many states, courts do not have a reliable mechanism for
identifying cases of domestic violence and matching families with
appropriate court processes and services. This increases the
likelihood that these critical cases will fall between the cracks of an
overloaded system.  For this reason, the American Law Institute
recommends that the existence of domestic violence be disclosed in
parenting plans.   Additionally, it recommends that courts develop144
a process for screening and referral to appropriate services,  and145
hold hearings to review parenting plans and order “protective
measures.”146
3.  The Need for Differential Case Management and Unified
Family Courts 
Recognizing that families have different needs, some court
systems “customize” handling of family cases.   This may occur147
through Differential Case Management or the creation of unified
family courts, both of which are especially valuable to families
experiencing domestic violence.  
Differential Case Management involves early screening of cases,
assessment of the family’s needs, and referral to appropriate services
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(discussing models of unified family courts).
154. Schwarz, supra note 147, at 309–10 (also discusses contrary points of
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Innovative Judicial Paradigms, 69 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 139 (2000) (discussion of
specialized domestic violence courts).
155. Elrod, supra note 91, at 522.
and court processes.   Early intervention allows case managers to148
perform “triage” and expedite the handling of cases involving issues
such as domestic violence.   Courts using Differential Case149
Management are ideally situated to identify and consider the type of
violence experienced by families.
The American Bar Association recommends that all jurisdictions
establish unified family courts.   In addition to providing screening150
and linking families with needed services, these courts assure that
actions pertaining to a given family are heard in the same court, by
the same judge, and that the family works with a single case manager
and treatment team to develop a service plan.   This151
interdisciplinary approach enhances safety, accountability, and
efficiency, and  provides comprehensive services to the families who
need them the most.   Families are educated about the divorce152
processes available to them and they may be counseled by specially
trained personnel.   In addition to providing thorough screening,153
unified court systems avoid multiple actions, conflicting orders, and
unnecessary delays.154
B.  Matching Families with Services and Processes
Determining the type of violence experienced would help
professionals make safer and more appropriate referrals and could
assist families in choosing a divorce process.   For example, as155
Johnson suggests, some programs could be dangerous for victims of
Intimate Terrorism:
. . . it is common for couples involved in violence to be
referred to couples counseling or mediation, a strategy that
can be extremely dangerous for women entrapped in intimate
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Pearson, Parent Education in the Domestic Relations Court: A Multisite
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531–32 (2001).
159. Family Dissolution, supra note 144, § 2.07(1) (2002).
160. Ver Steegh, Mandatory, supra  note 158, at 895–99; Debra A. Clement,
1998 Nationwide Survey of the Legal Status of Parent Education, 37 Fam. &
Conciliation Courts Rev. 219, 220–21 (1998).
161. Thoennes & Pearson, supra note 157, at 196 (93% said participation should
be mandatory).
162. Id. at 195.
terrorism, who risk retaliation if they disclose information
about the abuse in front of the abuser.  In this situation,
couples counseling would be not only inappropriate, but
dangerous.  For couples involved in situational couple
violence, however, such counseling might provide useful
skills in problem-solving, anger management, and conflict
resolution.156
Thus, identifying the type of violence experienced has immediate and
practical implications.
1.  Participation in Parent Education Programs
In less than thirty years, parent education programs have
proliferated in every state.   Parent education programs generally157
provide information on such topics as the emotional and legal aspects
of divorce, the impact of divorce on children, co-parenting
arrangements, communication skills, and community resources.158
For example, the American Law Institute suggests that parents be
informed about parenting plan preparation, the needs of children, the
impact of conflict and domestic violence on children and appropriate
referrals, and mediation.   Parent education programs may be159
mandatory or discretionary, and they may be implemented statewide
or through local judicial rules.160
Parent response to the programs has been quite positive.  Studies
show parental satisfaction levels over ninety percent.   Some, but161
not all, studies show that participating parents are better able to
cooperate after completing parent education programs.   The162
programs help to reduce conflict and make parents aware of the needs
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165. Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional Partnerships
with the Court on Behalf of High-Conflict Divorcing Families and their Children:
Who Needs What Kind of Help?, 22 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 453, 468 (2000).
166. Thoennes & Pearson, supra note 157, at 197.
167. Id. at 197–98.
168. Geri S. W. Fuhrmann, Psy.D., is Director of the Child and Family Forensic
Center at UMass Memorial Health Care, Inc., and Associate Professor of psychiatry
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of the children,  and both highly conflicted and less conflicted163
parents appear to benefit.164
Not surprisingly, some parents profit more than others from
parent education.   Those who attend early in the divorce process,165 166
attend more sessions overall, and attend programs focusing on
communications skills and co-parenting appear to benefit the most.167
The question of whether victims of domestic violence should
attend parent education programs has been controversial.  In general,
parent educators favor their attendance, while domestic violence
advocates believe that attendance should be waived.  Fuhrmann,
McGill, and O’Connell  speculate that these two professional168
groups focus on victims of different types of violence, noting that
“understanding that there are several types of violence could,
possibly, unlock the domestic violence/parent education impasse.”169
Clearly, victims of Intimate Terrorism need specialized parent
education groups.  Messages about cooperative parenting and
enhancing communication traditionally given in parent education
classes are dangerous and inappropriate for victims of Intimate
Terrorism.   Rather than emphasizing co-parenting and170
communication skills, specialized groups should stress separate
parallel parenting and detailed safety planning. In addition, these
victims need information on the dynamics of abuse, ways that their
partner may try to manipulate the divorce process, and community
referrals.171
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Special safety precautions are also necessary in order to keep
victims of Intimate Terrorism safe. Parents should never be allowed
to attend the same session, and the perpetrator should not be informed
of the victim’s planned date of attendance.  The location of parent
education classes should be kept confidential, and heightened
security precautions, including visible security guards, weapon
screening, and escort services should be provided.172
Parents who have experienced Situational Couple Violence may
benefit from specialized parent education groups as well.  However,
they are more likely  to profit from standard parent education classes
that include content on anger management and enhancing
communications skills than are couples with a history of Intimate
Terrorism.   In addition, messages about reducing conflict levels173
and focusing on the needs of children would be very appropriate for
parents who have experienced Situational Couple Violence.
2.  Participation in Mediation
Mediation is a process where a third-party neutral assists the
parties in reaching a voluntary resolution.  The mediator facilitates
discussion of the party’s underlying interests and helps them to
explore options and ultimately reach agreement.   Whether couples174
with a history of domestic violence should enter into mediation is a
subject of great controversy. 
Women’s advocates often express strong reservations about
allowing victims of domestic violence to enter mediation.  Concerns
stem from the theory that the power imbalance between the victim
and the perpetrator will result in an unfair coerced settlement.   For175
example, victims of abuse may fear retaliation if they do not
acquiesce to the batterer’s wishes.   At least one study found that176
victims perceive themselves as more powerless than other women
and more likely to believe that the perpetrator could “out-talk” them
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and would retaliate if they disagreed with him.   Women’s177
advocates believe that mediators do not screen adequately for
domestic violence and are inadequately trained to deal with abuse.
Indeed, only seventy percent of surveyed mediation programs report
regular mediator training on domestic violence.178
Mediators generally believe that power imbalances can usually be
managed by a specially trained mediator using special procedures.
Such procedures include making detailed security arrangements,
encouraging representation, requiring and enforcing strict ground
rules, using separate caucuses, and monitoring for lopsided
agreements.   Research shows that violent couples are as satisfied179
with the mediation process and the resulting agreements reached as
are nonviolent couples.  The rate of compliance with agreements is
also similar.180
As in the controversy over parent education, the existence of
different types of domestic violence may provide a way to bridge the
gap in thinking between women’s advocates and mediators on this
issue.  As researcher Joan Kelly concludes:
These varied types of partner violence suggest a need to
revisit blanket policies regarding mediation and domestic
violence, because not all violence in marriages leads to an
inability to meet together in mediation settings, nor is fear of
the partner a major component in common couple violence.181
The American Law Institute recommends that mediators be
required to screen for domestic violence and to ensure that
participants give “meaningful consent” to participation.   In182
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addition, courts are not allowed to compel any service requiring
“face-to-face” meetings.183
Mediation may be inappropriate in cases of Intimate Terrorism,
the type of violence women’s advocates are most likely to see.
However, mediation may be quite helpful to couples with a history
of Situational Couple Violence who need to learn to resolve conflict
more peacefully.   Indeed, sending Situational Couple Violence184
couples into the adversary system may only serve to heighten their
conflict level.185
C.  Regulating Perpetrator Contact with Children
The type of violence experienced also has implications for
structuring post-decision relationships with children.  
1.  Supervised Visitation
Because parental rights are not terminated in divorce proceedings,
the perpetrator of domestic violence will have continued access to the
children in the form of visitation.   As discussed above, this may be186
appropriate in cases of Situational Couple Violence, assuming the
parties have improved their conflict resolution skills and have been
informed about the harm to children resulting from ongoing conflict.
However, in cases of Intimate Terrorism visitation can be
dangerous. The batterer may harm the children through acts of
violence or psychological abuse. In addition, the abuser is likely to
use visitation to assault or manipulate the mother in an attempt to
reassert the pattern of domination and control.   Unfortunately,187
some intimate terrorists are granted unrestricted visitation of their
children.188
Experts suggest consideration of the following factors when
assessing risk to children:
2005] NANCY VER STEEGH 1409
189. Id. at 157–70; Jaffe et al., supra note 27, at 106–11 (listing thirteen factors
for assessing risk to children).
190. Martha Bailey, Supervised Access:  A Long-Term Solution?, 37 Fam. &
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193. Elrod, supra note 91; See Standards and guidelines for Supervised
Visitation Network Practice, 36 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 108 (1998); Robert
B. Straus, Supervised Visitation and Family Violence, 29 Fam. L. Q. 229, 244–51
(1995).
194. Barbara E. Flory et al.,  An Exploratory Study of Supervised Access and
Custody, 39 Fam. Ct. Rev. 469, 473 (2001); Jerry H. Dunn et al.,  An Exploratory
Study of Supervised Access and Custody Exchange Services: The Children’s
1. history of physical abuse toward the children; 
2. history of neglectful or underinvolved parenting; 
3. history of sexual abuse or boundary violations; 
4. level of physical danger toward adult partner; level of
psychological cruelty toward partner and children; 
5 history of using children to manipulate; 
6. willingness to harm children incidental to abuse of
mother; 
7. level of coercive control exercised during
relationship; 
8. level of entitlement and self-centeredness; 
9. history of substance abuse; 
    10. refusal to accept end of relationship; 
    11. level of risk of child abduction; 
    12. refusal to accept responsibility for past actions; and 
    13. mental health history.189
The above factors are more indicative of Intimate Terrorism than
Situational Couple Violence, so identifying the type of violence
experienced would provide another avenue for protecting children.
Certainly an argument can be made that in some cases, Intimate
Terrorists should not be allowed visitation, especially if the child
strongly objects.   However, many experts believe that children190
benefit from ongoing but limited contact with the abusive parent.191
This is because the visits provide a “reality check” for the child and
help the child come to terms with the abuser.192
Supervised visitation centers provide a safe location for visits
under the oversight of trained personnel who can intervene if
problems arise.   Parents arrive and depart at different times so that193
there is no opportunity for contact. Staff members observe the visits
and interact with parents to provide informal advice and education.194
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2001).
202. Jasinski & Williams, supra note 201, at 226.
203. Renzetti et al., supra note 2, at 268.
Visiting parents are prohibited from whispering to children, forcing
physical contact, or making negative comments about family
members.   Most families view the program favorably,  and there195 196
is some indication that parental attitudes are positively affected.197
In cases of Intimate Terrorism, the existence of supervised
visitation assists courts in balancing ongoing contact and safety.198
Consequently, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges encourages ordering supervised visitation in cases of domestic
violence,  and states such as Louisiana provide for supervised199
visitation conditioned on completion of treatment.200
When supervised visitation has been ordered, a perpetrator may
later seek unsupervised visitation based upon completion of a
treatment program.  Such a request raises the issue of the
effectiveness of treatment programs.  Unfortunately, research
findings concerning the effectiveness of perpetrator treatment
programs are unclear.   Many programs have high drop-out rates,201 202
and researchers disagree about how to measure outcomes.   Daniel203
G. Saunders suggests that researchers consider the interaction of
perpetrator traits and treatment models:
The major finding of this study is that personality styles and
disorders interacted with the type of treatment being received.
Men with antisocial traits were less likely to be violent after
treatment if they attended the feminist-cognitive-behavioral
treatment.  Men with dependent traits, on the other hand, had
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better outcomes with the process-psycho dynamic
treatment.204
Thus, differentiating types of perpetrators and types of violence
holds promise for designing and implementing effective treatment
programs for batterers.  For example, interventions focusing on
power and control are likely to be more helpful in cases of Intimate
Terrorism,  while anger management treatment may be more useful205
in cases of Situational Couple Violence.206
Bancroft and Silverman recommend a “tiered approach” to
visitation for batterers who complete treatment and behave
appropriately.  Visitation would initially start at a visitation center,
followed by supervised visitation in the community.  The next level
would involve supervision by friends or relatives and eventually
visitation might include short periods of unsupervised time.207
Visitation should not occur over the objection of the child and should
not include overnight visits.208
The American Law Institute recommends that in cases involving
domestic violence, the court “should impose limits that are
reasonably calculated to protect the child, child’s parent, or other
member of the household from harm.”   This includes reduced and209
supervised visitation.210
2.  Parent Coordinators
Because cases involving violence or high conflict require extra
oversight and monitoring, some courts have created the role of parent
coordinator.   Parent coordinators are analogous to special masters211
used in federal civil cases where judges appoint professionals with
particular subject matter expertise and delegate limited decision
making power to them.   In 2000, the American Bar Association212
Family Law Section held an interdisciplinary conference on high
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215. Christine A. Coates et al., Parenting Coordination for High-Conflict
Families, 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 246, 247 (2004).  See also AFCC Task Force on
Parenting Coordination, Model Standards of Practice for Parenting Coordinators
( D r a f t  f o r  C o m m e n t  M a r c h  2 0 0 5 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t
http://www.afccnet.org/about/parent_coord_tf.asp  [hereinafater AFCC Task Force
2005] (“The overall objective of parenting coordination is to assist high conflict
parents to implement their parenting plan, to ensure compliance with the details of
the plan, to resolve conflicts regarding their children and the parenting plan in a
timely manner, and to protect and sustain safe, healthy, and meaningful parent-child
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218. Parent coordinators may make decisions or make recommendations to the
court depending on how they are authorized and what the parties have stipulated.
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at 556 (2003). 
219. Sullivan, supra note 212, at 576; AFCC Task Force 2003, supra note 211,
at 544.  See also AFCC  Task Force 2005, supra note 215, at Stnd XI (listing
seventeen issues that parenting coordinators may resolve).
220. AFCC Task Force 2003, supra note 211, at 543.  See also AFCC Task
Force 2005, supra note 215, at Stnd XI (“A PC should refrain from making
decisions that would change legal and physical custody from one parent to the other
or that would change the parenting plan in such a way that precipitates a change in
child support.”).
221. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions, supra note 163, at 143.
conflict cases and the conferees recommended appointing parenting
coordinators or masters to manage recurring child custody and access
disputes.   By 2003, at least fourteen states had implemented this213
new professional role.  214
Parent coordinators assist parents in creating, implementing, and
monitoring parenting plans.  Some states limit appointment of215
parent coordinators to post-decree matters while other states involve
them in the divorce process.  During the divorce process, parent216
coordinators may function as the leader of an interdisciplinary team
assisting the family.   More typically parent coordinators make217
decisions or recommendations  about day-to-day matters such as218
scheduling, activities, transportation, child care, discipline, education,
and health care.   They generally cannot modify custody, allow219
relocation, or make any other major changes to court orders.220
Rather, they settle more routine parenting disputes outside of the
court setting.   Thus, depending on the needs of the family, parent221
coordinators may perform assessments, provide education, serve as
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case coordinator, assist with conflict management, and potentially
make binding decisions or recommendations to the court.222
Parent coordinators are usually appointed by stipulation of the
parties in order to avoid concerns about delegation of judicial
authority and continuing jurisdiction.  However, appointment may be
authorized by state statute, court rule, or court order.   A well-223
drafted stipulation should include the terms of appointment, scope of
decision making, discussion of confidentiality, and procedures for
challenging decisions and removal.   At least one state parenting224
coordinator statute has withstood challenge.  The Oklahoma
parenting coordinator statute was held not to violate equal protection
and due process.  225
The qualifications of parent coordinators vary by state, but many
have backgrounds in mental health or conflict resolution.226
Preliminary research shows that parents report reduced levels of
conflict and that relitigation rates are substantially reduced when
parent coordinators are used.227
Parent coordinators are likely to be especially useful in cases
involving domestic violence.   However, depending on the type of228
violence involved, the role of the parent coordinator may change.  In
cases of Intimate Terrorism, the parent coordinator should act as an
arbitrator and be able to call upon the judge for immediate sanctions
if the perpetrator is threatening or fails to comply with agreements or
court orders.  As the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts
(AFCC) Task Force on Parenting Coordination explains:
In those cases of domestic violence where one parent seeks to
obtain and maintain power and control over the other, the role
of the PC [parent coordinator] changes to an almost purely
enforcement function.  Here the PC  is likely to be dealing
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with a court order, the more detailed the better, rather than a
mutually agreed upon parenting plan; and the role is to ensure
compliance with the details of the order and to test each
request for variance from its terms with an eye to protecting
the custodial parent’s autonomy to make decisions based on
the children’s best interests and guarding against
manipulation by the abusing parent.229
However, in cases of Situational Couple Violence, the parent
coordinator should take an educational approach, function as a
mediator, and model conflict resolution skills.230
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR SUBSTANTIVE LAW REFORM
Courts can more effectively meet the needs of children by
differentiating between cases of Situational Couple Violence and
Intimate Terrorism.  With support, education, and careful planning,
children may be parallel parented  by parents with a history of231
Situational Couple Violence.  However, children who are exposed to
Intimate Terrorism need additional protection.  They require physical
and emotional safety, structure and predictability, and a strong bond
with the nonviolent parent.  Without intensive intervention,
perpetrators of Intimate Terrorism are incapable of meeting these
needs and awarding them custody or unsupervised visitation
endangers the children.
Substantive custody law should focus on meeting the needs of
children exposed to domestic violence.  Unfortunately, statutes often
fall short of the mark.  Even when domestic violence is identified,
courts are not given adequate guidance in evaluating the violence and
meeting the needs of children.  Although typologies are not refined
sufficiently for exact application, viewing child custody statutes
through the lens of different types of violence helps explain the
superficial and imprecise analyses that some courts undertake.
A.  Most Legal Definitions of Domestic Violence Are Inadequate
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encompass “physical harm or threat thereof”).
233. Id. §  2.03(7)  (defining domestic violence as “the infliction of physical
injury, or the creation of a reasonable fear thereof, by a parent or a present or
former member of the child’s household, against the child or another member of the
household.  Reasonable action taken by an individual for self-protection, or the
protection of another individual, is not domestic violence.”)  See also National
Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges, Family Violence: A Model State Code
1 (1994):
Sec. 102 Definitions.
Unless the context otherwise requires, as used in the Model Code:1.
“Domestic or family violence” means the occurrence of one or more of the
following acts by a family or household member, but does not include acts
of self-defense:
(a) Attempting to cause or causing physical harm to another family or
household member;
(b) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical harm;
(c) Causing a family or household member to engage involuntarily in
sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress.
234. La. R.S. 9:362(3) (2004).
235. N.D.C.C. 14-07.1-01(2).
Most legal definitions of domestic violence are drawn to include
violent acts and fear of violent acts.   However, because these232
defining statutes do not address patterns of domination, coercion, and
control, they target Situational Couple Violence while seeming to
ignore the dynamics of Intimate Terrorism.
Three typical definitions of domestic violence illustrate the
problem.  The American Law Institute defines domestic violence as
“the infliction of physical injury or the creation of a reasonable fear
thereof. . . .”   Similarly the Louisiana definition provides that233
“‘Family violence’ includes but is not limited to physical or sexual
abuse and any offense against the person as defined in the Criminal
Code. . . .”   Finally, the North Dakota definition of domestic234
violence “includes physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity
compelled by physical force, assault, or the infliction of fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, sexual activity compelled by
physical force, or assault. . . .”235
These definitions do not go to the heart of Intimate Terrorism, the
pattern of coercive control exerted through a variety of tactics and
behaviors. Mary Ann Dutton describes the pattern as follows:
. . . a pattern of coercive behavior that changes the dynamics
of an intimate relationship within which it occurs.  Once the
pattern of coercive control is established, both parties
understand differently the meaning of specific actions and
words.  Domestic violence is not simply a list of discrete
behaviors, but is a pattern of behavior exhibited by the
batterer that includes words, actions, and gestures, which,
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237. Stark, Re-Presenting, supra note 40, at 980–81  (1995).
238. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4002(1)B (2004).
taken together, establish power and control over an intimate
partner.236
By analogy, Evan Stark illustrates the lack of focus on coercive
control in the context of criminal definitions by explaining that “this
categorization of domestic violence has created a new (second) class
of misdemeanor assaults rather than criminalizing the far more severe
pattern of coercive behaviors that are distinctive to partner
relationships, that is battering.”237
The failure to include definitional statutory language describing
the pattern of control characteristic of Intimate Terrorism has several
consequences.  First, in many states a single overarching definition
of domestic violence applies to both protective orders and child
custody determinations.  Thus, in custody determinations courts
correctly focus on specific acts of violence but are less likely to
assign importance to patterns of coercion and control that are
significant with respect to parenting.  This may result in paying
needed attention to Situational Couple Violence while discounting
the dynamics and consequences of Intimate Terrorism.  Second, by
failing to include language regarding patterns of control, these
definitions reinforce the misguided notion (discussed previously) that
all domestic violence is really Situational Couple Violence.  As a
result, the danger to victims and children experiencing Intimate
Terrorism is underestimated and Intimate Terrorists may be allowed
to use the legal system as an instrument of harassment and control.
Third, proof of a pattern of coercive control could lend support to a
victim’s claim of self-defense and assist courts in more accurately
differentiating cases of Violent Resistance to Intimate Terrorism
from cases of female-initiated Situational Couple Violence.  Fourth,
as will be discussed below, imprecise definitions can lead to the
inappropriate triggering of custody presumptions (triggering them in
cases of Situational Couple Violence but not Intimate Terrorism) and
confusion about when such presumptions have been rebutted.
Maine, Nevada, Minnesota, and Missouri have adopted statutory
definitions of domestic violence that come closer to encompassing
patterns of coercive control.  The Maine definition includes,
“attempting to place or placing another in fear of bodily injury
through any course of conduct, including, but not limited to,
threatening, harassing or tormenting behavior.”   It also discusses238
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using intimidation to compel conduct,  restricting movement,  and239 240
being in the victim’s vicinity without reasonable cause.   The241
Nevada statute similarly discusses the compelling of acts  and a242
“knowing, purposeful or reckless course of conduct intended to
harass the other.”   The Minnesota definition of domestic abuse243 244
includes terroristic threats which are defined as threatening “directly
or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to
terrorize another… or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such
terror . . . .”   Missouri defines abuse as follows:245
“Abuse” includes but is not limited to the occurrence of any
of the following acts, attempts or threats against a person who
may be protected pursuant to sections 455.010 to 455.085:
(a) “Assault,” purposely or knowingly placing or attempting
to place another in fear of physical harm;
(b) “Battery,” purposely or knowingly causing physical harm
to another with or without a deadly weapon;
(c) “Coercion,” compelling another by force or threat of force
to engage in conduct from which the latter has a right to
abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the person has a
right to engage;
(d) “Harassment,” engaging in a purposeful or knowing
course of conduct involving more than one incident that
alarms or causes distress to another adult and serves no
legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as
would cause a reasonable adult to suffer substantial emotional
distress and must actually cause substantial emotional distress
to the petitioner. Such conduct might include, but is not
limited to:
a. Following another about in a public place or places;
b.Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of another; but does not include constitutionally
protected activity;
(e) “Sexual assault,” causing or attempting to cause another
to engage involuntarily in any sexual act by force, threat of
force, or duress;
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(f) “Unlawful imprisonment,” holding, confining, detaining
or abducting another person against that person’s will . . . .246
While these definitions encompass more behaviors than typical
statutes, none of these statutes directly address patterns of coercive
domination including tactics such as psychological abuse, economic
control, use of privilege and punishment, isolation, and manipulation
of children.
Because Intimate Terrorism is so dangerous and insidious,
statutory definitions should be amended to add language specifically
describing it. Language could be added to existing definitions of
domestic violence such as that contained in the American Law
Institute recommendations.  The following is an example of possible
language:
Domestic violence involves the infliction of physical injury
or the creation of a reasonable fear thereof and may include
a pattern of coercive control involving tactics such as threats,
intimidation, psychological and emotional abuse, sexual
abuse, isolation of the victim, manipulation of children, and
exercise of economic control.
Adding such language to state statutory definitions will draw
attention to the range of intimidation typical of Intimate Terrorism
and ensure that evidence of a variety of coercive tactics will be seen
as relevant to establishing the pattern of abuse.  Victims of Intimate
Terrorism and children exposed to it will ultimately be better
protected.
B.  Domestic Violence and “Best Interests”
1.  Domestic Violence as a Single Factor
Because courts historically failed to recognize the nexus between
domestic violence and parenting, during the 1980s, women’s
advocates lobbied for the inclusion of domestic violence as a factor
in determining the best interests of the child.   This effort was247
bolstered by mounting empirical evidence concerning the harm to
children from witnessing abuse and the prevalence of concurrent
child abuse.   Currently nearly every state includes domestic248
violence as an explicit factor to be considered in determining
custody.249
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26 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 775, 790-1 (2000).  See Family Dissolution, supra note
144, at § 2.11 Comment (c) (2002) (discussing cases where domestic violence is
weighed as a factor in deciding custody); Lemon, supra note 92, at 608–11
(discussing cases where batterers were awarded custody).
251. Minn. Stat. § 518.17 subd. 1(a)(12).
252. Mary Grams, Guardians Ad Litem and the Cycle of Domestic Violence:
How the Recommendations Turn, 22 Law & Ineq. 105, 137 (2004).  See Bancroft
& Silverman, supra note 25, at 29–37.  Typical characteristics include:
authoritarianism; underinvolvement, neglect, and irresponsibility; undermining the
mother; self-centeredness; manipulativeness; and ability to perform under
observation. Id.
In cases of Situational Couple Violence, case-by-case evaluation
of the children’s needs is likely to be appropriate, and a best interests
analysis can be useful in creating a highly structured parenting plan
that requires little contact between the parents.  Of course, this
assumes that the court will give sufficient weight to the domestic
violence factor.
However, in cases involving Intimate Terrorism, inclusion of
domestic violence as one factor among many may not provide
adequate protection for children.  Judges who are unfamiliar with the
dynamics of Intimate Terrorism may discount the seriousness of the
abuse and give the factor too little weight.   For example,250
Minnesota’s statute is a typical “best interests” statute providing that
the court consider “the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser,
if related to domestic abuse…that has occurred between the parents
or between a parent and another individual. . . .”   This factor is to251
be considered along with twelve other factors in determining the best
interests of the child.
Even if the court weighs the domestic violence factor heavily, as
discussed above, the statutory definition of domestic violence is
unlikely to address patterns of coercive control.  Consequently, courts
are implicitly encouraged to underestimate the serious consequences
of Intimate Terrorism in making child custody determinations.  Thus,
in addition to amending statutory definitions of domestic violence,
states that use a domestic violence as a best interests factor should
include language (as suggested above) describing the pattern of
coercive control evident in Intimate Terrorism cases.  Additionally
with respect to custody determinations, states could require courts to
make findings concerning a listing of parenting behaviors common
to Intimate Terrorists.   However, this determination may best be252
left to experts advising the court.
2.  Use of Experts
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253. See William G. Austin, Partner Violence and Risk Assessment in Child
Custody Evaluations, 39 Fam. Ct. Rev. 483 (2001) (urging a risk assessment
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254. Lynn Hecht Schafran,  Evaluating the Evaluator, 42 No. 1 Judges’ J. 10
(2003) (domestic violence not mentioned in reports by Gals).
255. Dalton, supra note 2, at 273, 287; Meier, supra note 91, at 708.  For
discussion of protocol for child custody evaluation see American Bar Association,
supra note 126, at 589.  See also AFCC Model Standards of Practice for Child
Custody Evaluation; Schafran, supra note 254, at 738 (listing factors evaluators
erringly thought were more important than a history of abuse); Rita Smith &
Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of Domestic Violence and
Child Abuse in Custody Determinations,  36 No. 4 Judges’ J. 38, 41 (1997)
(evaluators not trained about domestic violence may ignore or minimize violence);
June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle:  Creating a New Model
of Parental Partnership, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1091, n. 131 (1999) (90.6% of
psychologists would not consider allegation of physical child abuse as grounds for
denying custody).
256. Bancroft & Silverman, supra note 25, at 197; Stephen P. Herman, Child
Custody Evaluations and the Need for Standards of Care and Peer Review, 1 J.
Center for Child. & Cts. 139 (1999).  See Family Dissolution, supra note 144, §
2.11(3) (2002) (providing that the court “should” order an investigation or appoint
a Gal or attorney unless satisfied that adequate information will be secured).
257. William G. Austin, Assessing Credibility in Allegations of Marital Violence
in the High-Conflict Child Custody Case, 38 Fam. & Conciliation Courts Rev. 462,
463–64 (2000).
In addition to amending relevant statutory sections, custody
evaluators and guardians ad litem can effectively assist the court by
taking into account the dynamics of Situational Couple Violence and
Intimate Terrorism when making risk assessments and custody and
access recommendations.   Unfortunately, both groups have been253
criticized for failing to identify domestic violence  and for viewing254
all domestic violence as conflict-based (Situational Couple
Violence), and consequently overlooking control-based violence
(Intimate Terrorism).255
The custody evaluator should make an in-depth investigation,
which includes obtaining relevant police and court records,
interviewing all parties with information, making home visits, and
completing any psychological testing.   He or she should inform the256
court concerning the frequency and severity of the violence, the type
of violence, and the impact of the violence on the children.257
Multi-disciplinary teams including guardians ad litem and
custody evaluators are ideally situated to assist families with a history
of Situational Couple Violence in reducing conflict levels and
developing parenting plans.  In contrast, these professionals can
provide important protection to children exposed to Intimate
Terrorism by alerting courts to the pattern of coercive control and by
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260. Minn. Stat. § 518.17 subd. 2(a)(13) provides, “except in cases in which a
finding of domestic abuse as defined in section 518B.01 has been made, the
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strongly recommending the use of supervised visitation and parenting
coordinators.
 C.  “Friendly Parent” Provisions and Joint Custody
1.  “Friendly Parent” Provisions
During the 1980s, public policy shifted to encourage continued
involvement by both parents after divorce.  This led to the passage of
best interest factors favoring the parent most willing to encourage
contact with the other parent, commonly referred to as “friendly
parent” provisions.   Twenty-eight states have enacted such258
provisions.259
“Friendly parent” provisions should not be used in cases
involving domestic violence. Exercise of such provisions is
especially dangerous in cases of Intimate Terrorism for several
reasons:  (1) the batterer may appear to be the more cooperative
parent and thus gain custody or unrestricted access to the children;
(2) the victim may be coerced into agreeing to unrestricted visitation
in order to keep custody; (3) the victim may be forced to have
additional ongoing contact with the batterer; and (4) the batterer is
likely to use the provision as a means to control and manipulate the
process.
“Friendly parent” provisions are counterproductive in cases of
Situational Couple Violence as well because they encourage
cooperative parenting in cases where increased contact may
exacerbate conflict levels.  While parents with a history of Situational
Couple Violence may be able to parallel parent under a carefully
drafted parenting plan, they should not be encouraged to coparent or
share joint physical custody.  States with “friendly parent” provisions
should explicitly provide that they do not apply in cases of domestic
violence.260
2.  Joint Custody
The movement supporting continued involvement by both parents
after divorce led to increased use of various forms of joint custody
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and, consequently, nearly every state has adopted joint custody in
some form.   Like “friendly parent” provisions, joint legal or261
physical custody is dangerous for victims of Intimate Terrorism
because continued contact provides the opportunity for manipulation,
control, and additional violence by the batterer.  Joint physical262
custody is ill-advised for parents with a history of Situational Couple
Violence, although in some cases, it is possible that parents may be
able to share joint legal custody pursuant to a carefully drafted
parenting plan.  States should explicitly provide that joint legal and
physical custody is inappropriate in cases of domestic violence.263
For example, Minnesota has adopted a rebuttable presumption
against ordering joint legal or physical custody in cases of domestic
abuse.  264
D.  Presumptions Against Custody Awards to Batterers
Concern about the application of “friendly parent” provisions and
joint custody in domestic violence cases led several influential bodies
to encourage states to adopt rebuttable presumptions against custody
awards to batterers.  In 1990, Congress urged creation of such
presumptions  and in 1994 the National Council of Juvenile and265
Family Court Judges drafted a Model Code on Domestic Violence
that contains a rebuttable presumption.  The presumption states, “it
is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest of the child to
be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical
custody with the perpetrator of family violence.”   Similarly the266
American Bar Association recommends that “[w]here there is proof
of [domestic violence], batterers should be presumed by law to be
unfit custodians for their children.”267
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As of 2001, sixteen states plus the District of Columbia had
adopted rebuttable presumptions regarding custody awards to
batterers.  Some of the states apply the presumption to all types of
custody while others apply it only to joint custody requests.  States
differ as to what showing is required to trigger the presumption and
to rebut it.268
1.  Triggering the Presumption
When viewed through the lens of a domestic violence typology,
rebuttable presumption statutes are both over and under inclusive.
Specifically, they are likely to include cases of Situational Couple
Violence (which arguably they should not) and at the same time, they
fail to reliably capture cases of Intimate Terrorism (which should fall
under their umbrella of coverage).
In cases of Intimate Terrorism, rebuttable presumptions against
custody awards to batterers are quite appropriate and they were likely
written with that scenario in mind.  As previous sections have
discussed, Intimate Terrorists are dangerous and unsuitable parents
who manipulate the court system to continue a pattern of abuse and
control.
However, in contrast, invoking a rebuttable presumption
regarding custody is inappropriate in cases of Situational Couple
Violence where enhanced conflict resolution skills and counseling
might enable both parents to remain more substantially involved in
the child’s life.  Cases of Situational Couple Violence require careful
but discretionary handling.  Not only is the nature of the violence
very different, but it is possible that both parents may initiate
Situational Couple Violence.  Automatic operation of a presumption
could be quite harmful to a child in such a case.
Unfortunately, presumption statutes are not carefully drafted to
target Intimate Terrorists. Just as definitions of domestic abuse fail
to include identification of a pattern of domination and control,
behaviors triggering presumption statutes may not distinguish
between Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence.269
For example, Louisiana has one of the most comprehensive
rebuttable presumption statutes.  It is presumed that “no parent who
has a history of perpetrating family violence shall be awarded sole
or joint custody of children.”  The court may find “a history of
1424 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
270. La. R.S. 9:362B (2004).  Note that it is possible that this section could be
used in rare cases of  Mutual Violent Control.
271. N.R.S. § 125.480(6) (2004).
perpetrating family violence,” triggering the presumption, if there is
one incident involving “serious bodily injury” or a finding of more
than one incident of violence.  This trigger could include cases of
Situational Couple Violence where there had been two occurrences
of relatively “mild” violence spaced over a long period of time.
However, the statute could (at least theoretically) exclude cases of
Intimate Terrorism where the pattern of domination and control was
maintained primarily through means other than repeated physical
violence.  Even if most cases of Intimate Terrorism are found to fall
within the purview of the statute, the court is not clearly directed
toward identifying them.
Rebuttable presumption statutes should be amended so that they
are triggered by patterns of coercive control.  This will maximize
their application in cases of Intimate Terrorism and make it less
likely that cases of Situational Couple Violence will fall within
them.
2.  Operation of the Presumption When Violence Is Alleged
Against Both Parents
States are divided about the application of presumptions against
custody awards to perpetrators in cases where both parents are
alleged to have a history of violence.  The Louisiana statute addresses
situations where both parents have a history of violence by awarding
custody “solely to the parent who is less likely to continue to
perpetuate family violence.”   Viewed through the typology lens,270
this is troubling for two reasons.  First, as discussed previously, in
cases of Intimate Terrorism the male is nearly always the perpetrator.
Consequently, in cases of Intimate Terrorism, this provision could be
construed against women who are violent resisters engaging in self
defense.  Second, it is more likely that both parents may initiate
violence in cases of Situational Couple Violence.  However, as
previously discussed, in Situational Couple Violence cases neither
parent should be automatically presumed to be unfit.
The Nevada statute is even more troubling.  It provides that “if it
is not possible for the court to determine which party is the primary
aggressor, the presumption … applies to both parties.”   As noted271
above, this section could defeat custody awards to victims of Intimate
Terrorism who defend themselves.  However, it is most likely to be
invoked in cases involving Situational Couple Violence.  In such a
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case, the statute could work to deprive a child of two potentially fit
parents.
In direct contrast to Nevada, the courts in North Dakota have held
that when both parents have an equivalent history of violence, the
presumption does not apply.   In cases of Situational Couple272
Violence, this is the most sensible solution.  However, in a case
involving Intimate Terrorism, the victim could be penalized for
defending herself.
When both parents have a history of domestic violence, the first
step should be to determine the type of violence involved.  The
presumption should apply to perpetrators who evidence a pattern of
coercive control.  As discussed previously, in cases of Intimate
Terrorism it is very likely that any violence perpetrated by the female
victim is in the nature of self defense (Violent Resistance).  Equally
initiated violence is only likely to occur in cases involving Situational
Couple Violence and, for the foregoing reasons, rebuttable
presumptions against custody awards to perpetrators should not apply
in those cases.
3.  Overcoming the Presumption
Questions also arise concerning when presumptions against
custody have been rebutted.  For example, the North Dakota statute
provides that the “presumption may be overcome only by clear and
convincing evidence that the best interests of the child require that
parent’s participation as a custodial parent.”   Such language gives273
the court little guidance and makes it more likely that cases of
Intimate Terrorism will be erroneously viewed as Situational Couple
Violence.  Not surprisingly, this statutory section has resulted in
numerous appellate cases.274
On its face, the Louisiana rebuttable presumption statute appears
to be more informative.  The presumption can be overcome by
showing the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
completion of a treatment program; lack of alcohol and drug use; and
proof that the parent’s participation is in the best interest of the child
or children.  While all of these factors are useful, they are not275
specifically directed at cessation of a pattern of domination and
control.  Although the statute requires a treatment program “designed
specifically for perpetrators of family violence,”  it does not276
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differentiate between treatment programs for Intimate Terrorists and
those for perpetrators of Situational Couple Violence.277
Consequently, a perpetrator of Intimate Terrorism could meet the
requirements of the statute while continuing to engage in coercive
control and dangerous parenting practices.  For example, in D.O.H.
v. T.L.H.,  completion of anger management therapy was deemed278
sufficient to rebut the statute even though no determination
concerning the type of violence was made.  As discussed above, anger
management classes are not appropriate for perpetrators of Intimate
Terrorism, although they are likely to be quite helpful to perpetrators
of Situational Couple Violence.
Rebuttable presumption statutes should be amended to require
greater court scrutiny in situations where the perpetrator seeks to
overcome the presumption.  Ideally a treatment plan based on an
assessment by an interdisciplinary team should be developed for each
batterer and compliance should be monitored for a year or more.  In
addition to taking concrete steps to end the violence and improve
parenting skills, attitudinal change should be evaluated by experts
before a court finding that the presumption is overcome.
E.  Termination of Parental Rights
In extreme cases of Intimate Terrorism where services such as
supervised visitation, parent coordination, and even incarceration are
not sufficient to keep the former partner and children safe, the state
should proceed with termination of the batterer’s parental rights.  As
Joan Meier explains, “TPR actions—send a clear message that
batterers have lost their ‘rights’ to their children—might actually
impact many abusers more powerfully than the more common civil or
criminal justice restraining orders or criminal adjudications.”279
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280. See Summary Comparison, below, comparing the dynamics of Intimate
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence and suggesting implications for parent
education, mediation, supervised visitation, parent coordination and substantive
child custody law.
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Differentiating among types of domestic violence has practical
implications for court procedure and for substantive child custody law.
The one-size-fits-all approach endangers children and victims because
the failure to differentiate among families means that cases of Intimate
Terrorism are often mischaracterized as cases of Situational Couple
Violence.  As a result, neither group is adequately protected or referred
to appropriate court procedures and services.  Unfortunately, the
language contained in most family law statutes supports the mistaken
view that domestic violence is a single phenomenon.
Courts should adopt a Differentiated Case Management system as
a part of a unified family court.  Each family should be screened for
domestic violence and consideration should be given to the type of
violence experienced.  An interdisciplinary team should make
appropriate referrals and develop a safety and treatment plan.  To the
extent that the type of violence can be determined, families
experiencing Intimate Terrorism should be treated differently from
those experiencing Situational Couple Violence.   The Summary280
Comparison Chart, below, compares the dynamics of Intimate
Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence and suggests implications
for parent education, mediation, supervised visitation, parent
coordination and substantive child custody law.
Cases Involving Intimate Terrorism. When children have been
exposed to Intimate Terrorism, their safety and protection should be
the primary focus of the legal system.  Parents should be required to
attend separate parent education programs where special safety
precautions are taken.  The program’s content should be  modified to
stress information about domestic violence, available services, safety
planning, the need for separate parallel parenting, and options for
restricted contact.  Mediation may not be appropriate for some of these
families; however, if the victim chooses to mediate, mediation should
only be undertaken by a specially trained mediator who uses special
precautions and safeguards.  Because Intimate Terrorists are unsuitable
parents, access to the children should be restricted through use of
supervised visitation and a parent coordinator should be appointed to
monitor safety, prevent the batterer from manipulating the process, and
arbitrate disputes.
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In states where domestic violence is a best interests factor, statutory
language should be amended to include patterns of coercive control
and give extra weight to this factor. In addition typical perpetrator
parenting behaviors could be specifically listed and experts could make
special domestic violence parenting evaluations.  Joint legal or physical
custody should be presumed to be inappropriate.
States should adopt rebuttable presumptions against legal or
physical custody awards to Intimate Terrorists.  The statutory language
should be carefully drafted so that the  presumption is triggered by
behaviors indicating a pattern of coercive control.  If mutual violence
is alleged, the presumption should be applied to the perpetrator
engaged in a pattern of coercive control.  Requirements for overcoming
the presumption should take the dynamic of coercive control into
account by requiring an interdisciplinary team to create and monitor a
treatment plan.  Such a plan should involve completion of an
appropriate treatment program and require the perpetrator to
demonstrate behavioral and attitudinal change.  In cases where there is
additional violence or where the batterer continues to manipulate and
threaten, termination of parental rights should be pursued.
Cases Involving Situational Couple Violence. Cases of Situational
Couple Violence must also be taken more seriously, but intervention
should focus on parent education and enhancement of conflict
resolution skills.  Parents should be required to attend separate
specialized parent education programs stressing information about
domestic violence, community referrals, safety planning, the
detrimental impact of ongoing conflict on children, conflict resolution
skills, anger management, and parallel parenting.  With appropriate
safeguards, mediation is likely to be appropriate and helpful to these
parents.  Emphasis should be placed on creating a detailed parenting
plan aimed at reducing conflict levels, avoiding situations that could
escalate into a violent encounter, establishing parenting ground rules,
and resolving access issues based on the needs of the children.  A
parenting coordinator should be appointed to continue the educational
process, monitor conflict levels, and assist in mediating day-to-day
decision making.
States should not use rebuttable presumptions against legal or
physical custody awards in cases of Situational Couple Violence, and
statutes should be amended to minimize the possibility that
presumptions will be triggered in these cases.  Instead of invoking a
presumption, an individualized best interests analysis should be made
by the court if the parties reach impasse in mediation.
The Need for Caution and Additional Research.  The failure to
distinguish between types of violence has contributed to the
development of one-size-fits-all stereotypes about violent families.
Less attention has been paid to families and family members who do
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not fit expected patterns.  Some of these “unexpected patterns” may
involve different types of abuse. The impact of the violence, as well as
the victim’s response to it are likely to be very different depending on
whether Intimate Terrorism or Situational Couple Violence is
involved.
Because Johnson’s work is theoretical and families experiencing
domestic violence are in life-threatening situations, caution must be
exercised in applying his or other typologies in practice.  Because all
families are different, they are unlikely to fit neatly into categories and
some may exhibit more than one type of violence.  More research is
needed to develop ways to screen for different types of violence and
verify their existence.
However, the recognition of different types of domestic violence
has opened cross-disciplinary communications and has the potential to
explain and settle long standing controversies and disputes.  Viewing
child custody law and process through the lens of Johnson’s domestic
violence typology also creates the opportunity to reexamine
assumptions, identify shortcomings, and conceptualize more effective
ways of helping children exposed to domestic violence.
Summary Comparison of Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple
Violence with Implications for Child Custody
Intimate Terrorism Situational
Couple
Violence
Motivation Power and control Isolated
reaction to
conflict
Pattern Violence as one tactic in
larger pattern of control
(No pattern of
coercive
control)
Frequency/sever
ity/injury
More frequent, more severe,
serious injury more likely
Generally fewer
incidents, may
be less severe,
serious injury
less likely
Perpetrator Male Male or female
or both
Escalation of
violence
Yes No
Prognosis for
parenting by
perpetrator
Poor Parallel
parenting
possible under
highly
structured
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parenting plan
(assuming
enhanced
conflict
resolution and
anger
management
skills)
Participation in
parent
education?
Only in classes with
specialized curriculum and
stringent safety precautions
Preferably in
specialized
class 
Participation in
mediation?
May not be appropriate—if
mediate, need specially
trained mediator using
special procedures and
precautions
Yes—likely to
be helpful in
developing
conflict
resolution skills
Supervised
visitation
necessary?
Yes Not needed in
many cases if
parents improve
conflict
resolution and
anger
management
skills and have
a highly
structured
parenting plan
Use of parent
coordinator?
Yes—monitors compliance
and acts as arbitrator
Yes—acts as
mediator and
educator
Differential
Case
Management
Yes Yes
Best interests
factors
Amend factors to include
patterns of coercive control
(list parenting behaviors and
use expert)—friendly parent
provisions inapplicable
Careful
discretionary
case-by-case
evaluation—frie
ndly parent
provisions
should not
apply
Joint custody Presumed inappropriate Inappropriate
(need detailed
parenting plan
designed to
meet needs of
family)
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Presumptions
against custody
awards to
perpetrators—
trigger
Amend presumptions
against custody awards to
perpetrators to target
patterns of coercive control
Presumptions
against custody
awards to
perpetrators
should not
apply
Presumptions
against custody
awards to
perpetrators— 
violence alleged
against both
parents
Presumption should apply to
perpetrator with pattern of
coercive control—female is
likely to be Violent Resister
Presumption
should not
apply
Presumptions
against custody
awards to
perpetrators— 
rebutting
Monitoring treatment plan
and change over time by
interdisciplinary team
Presumptions
should not
apply
Termination of
parental rights
Appropriate in some cases Inappropriate
